Introduction
Services mediated by ICT platforms -car sharing, hotel booking, social media, and more -have shaped the landscape of the digital markets and produced immense economic opportunities. Unfortunately, the growth of platform-mediated services comes with a cost.
One of the most serious challenges is the accumulation and centralization of "Big Data": linked transactions and attributes related to individual persons. The users of platforms not only surrender the value of their digital traces but also subject themselves to the power and control that data brokers exert for prediction and manipulation. Moreover, if the security of the data is compromised -as often occurs due to negligence of service providers -such power can fall into the wrong hands.
As the platform revolution takes hold in the area of public services, it is important to first safeguard such services from the pitfalls that have already been identified in the application of platform services to other areas. Just as importantly, public services have a responsibility to ensure that their technology is accessible, suitable, and appropriate for everyone. In the chase for innovation, many policymakers embrace technologies without proper consideration of all the costs and risks, and the consequences of misuse of Big Data collected via the administration of public services might be even more harmful not only because the data might be particularly sensitive and detailed but also because the users might not have a legitimate choice about whether to share their data.
The main risk lies in the aggregation of digital traces from many sources (services), which in turn allows user profiling and therefore surveillance, prediction, and control of user behaviour. We argue that in public services such profiling should not happen, as it undermines citizens' right to privacy and can be used to compromise democratic processes through the manipulation of incentives, opinions, and barriers to access. Therefore, any platforms that furnish government services to the public should be designed to prevent the linkage of data records from various interactions the citizens might have with the services. At the same time, the platforms should be interoperable, allowing users to access a diverse set of services without manually inputting the same data multiple times.
We propose a set of design principles that should be interpreted as design constraints for data systems in public services and which can serve as a guideline or benchmark in the assessment and deployment of platform-mediated services. The principles include minimizing control points and non-consensual trust relationships, empowering individuals to manage the linkages between their activities and empowering local communities to create their own trust relations.
We further propose a set of generic and generative design primitives that fulfil the proposed constraints and exemplify best practices in the deployment of platforms that deliver services in the public interest. For example, blind tokens and attribute-based authorization may prevent the undue linking of data records on individuals. We suggest that policymakers could adopt these design primitives and best practices as standards by which the appropriateness of candidate technology platforms can be measured in the context of their suitability for delivering public services.
Platform revolution in the private sector
The last decade has seen a revolution in the digital market. The terms "sharing economy" (Hamari, Sjöklint, & Ukkonen, 2016; Sundararajan, 2016) , "platform economy" (Kenney & Zysman, 2016) and "platform revolution" (Choudary, Van Alstyne, & Parker, 2016) all describe similar business models that rely on so-called collaborative consumption (Belk, 2014; Botsman & Rogers, 2010) : a model in which value is created from resources that are owned and controlled by individuals (customers) and not the service providers.
The collection, aggregation, and analysis of data are the key to the success of platform based services, because their business models are based on selling advertisements or fitting products to customers. Information directly related to the service, such as transactions made, interaction with other users, products or services viewed, is necessary for the providers to improve the service and provide greater utility to the users. At the same time this information provides platform owners with profits. The more data gathered, the more detailed is the aggregated profile of the user. This translates into far greater predictive accuracy of any algorithm that would attempt at matching advertisements or products to user groups and thus into bigger revenue.
In principle, the platform model looks as if the benefits were matched -the users receive convenience and utility of the service, the providers receive revenue for their analysis of user data. However, the benefits do not accrue equally. First, the revenue from user data has consistently grown -e.g. Facebook revenue (based in majority on advertisements) has increased despite recent criticism of the company's handling of user data (Thurm, 2019, p. 15) , whilst the platforms' utility is developing at a much more slower pace. The improvements introduced on the basis of user behavior analytics are arguably miniscule (Zuboff, 2019) . Thus, online service providers gain outsized gains compared to the utility they provide, and ultimately the gains come at the expense of customers. In effect, we could argue that the platform revolution has greatly contributed to the growth of economic inequalities.
The most highly valued companies are all based on online, platform mediated services (Forbes, 2019) , but the value they generate to their owners in large part comes from the resources of individuals that collaboratively co-produce the service and whose benefits from the service are proportionally diminishing.
Moreover, perception of the value of an individual's data is (sometimes purposefully) skewed so that users view their own data records as valueless. Capitalization on data is only possible when it reaches a critical mass -whether amassed by ad brokers or by the platform itself -that allows algorithms to achieve reasonable accuracy in predicting user behavior.
Thus, a single user record -even if composed of many user data points and properties -might seem worthless to the individual. She or he cannot capitalize on the data in an easy manner and even if that were possible (e.g. there are some companies that buy user data directly from users, often paying in cryptocurrencies (Barber, 2018) ), the return would be insignificant. At the same time, there is little public knowledge on how user data is being handled, sold and valued by online service providers and ad brokers (Hitlin & Rainie, 2019; Rieke, Yu, Robinson, & Von Hoboken, 2016) . In effect, while user data is the source of billions of dollars of income for online platform owners, the users of the platforms are often unaware of their data's value.
The actual value of user data is quite the reverse of this perception. After a critical mass of user data is reached for algorithms to operate successfully, the marginal value of each additional data record for the service provider is practically zero. Thus, whatever the value could be for an individual, it will always be higher than what it is for the data gatherers.
While the direct gains from utility of the platform hardly balance the value of the data given away, the missed opportunity understates the loss for platform customers: The real danger lies in the way the data are used to analyze, predict and "nudge" user behavior. When a vast number of detailed user records are combined -containing behaviors seemingly unrelated to the product advertised -it becomes possible to classify users according to their characteristics and previous behavior with precision. The identified user categories can be exposed to tailored persuasive messages to which they respond subconsciously, without proper cognitive control. This potentially can lead to many suboptimal choices for which customers incur financial losses.
Suboptimal shopping choices might lead to financial losses, but ads are also used to promote other types of decisions -social and political. In this case, the indirect costs of being manipulated into an opinion -or a vote -can be even greater. There is considerable debate over the influence of political campaigns carried on online platforms on political decisions.
These campaigns, just like commercial ones, can be based on detailed user profiles.
One advantage of online targeting over traditional ads is the fact that it is opaque to the recipients. They are not made aware of the fact that the ads they view are fitted to their personal characteristics and past behavior. Moreover, they are not aware that the ads received by others for the same product or political agenda might be different. In such situations, groups with particular interests can target the messages at specific user categories and increase their persuasive power. Specifically, it is possible to target different groups with varied messages and potentially make them support decisions that are contrary to their values and interests.
For example, a campaign for Brexit might advertise it as limiting migration and therefore creating job vacancies that can be occupied by middle or lower social classes.
However, business establishment has opposing interests, such as reduction of employment costs, for which larger migration is more preferred. For such groups, messages underscoring the possibility of raising prices after introducing tolls on foreign products will be more successful. However, if each of these two groups with conflicting interests were presented with both types of ads -as would be the case, for instance, with TV advertisements -they might perceive them as incoherent and not trustworthy. With "dark", targeted platform ads this does not happen.
A more nuanced but important threat in amassing user data and user profiling comes from the fact that the users of platforms -sources of data -are no longer neither the workforce nor customers for companies gathering data. This situation, as Zuboff notes (2015), breaks the regulatory mechanisms in market capitalism. The canonical capitalistic corporation depended on the population as its source of workforce and as customers (H. Smith, 2012 ). An increase in prices had to be balanced by an increase in wages, so that workers' sustenance was assured (A. Smith, 1776) . Such reciprocal interdependencies were crucial for market selfregulation as well as for maintaining democratic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) .
The giant firms that amass the greatest volumes of data are not subjected to such dependencies. Their workforce is miniscule compared to standard corporations of productive capitalism, and they do not constitute the customer base. Ad brokers and data analysts are customers and their needs and resources determine the demand.
Platform revolution in the public sector Massive data gathering
If the platform revolution were implemented in the public sector to provide public services via platforms and apps, then the Big Data gathered from user behavior and from various device sensors could provide the basis for revolutionizing the public sector. Services would be better fitted, policy making could become more data-driven, and the costs would be reduced for both the administration of the public sector as well as for citizens. This would comply with a widely shared sentiment that while Big Data advantages have boosted the business sector, similar advantages have yet to be realized in the public sector (González-Bailón, 2013; Kim, Trimi, & Chung, 2014) . However, extensive data gathering and analysis in the public sector can pose the same risks as in commercial applications as well as some even more daunting, specific to the sensitivity and possible abuse of the data needed to provision public services. So far, reservations about Big Data application in the public sector were usually focused on security issues (Mergel, Rethemeyer, & Isett, 2016) and privacy (Desouza & Jacob, 2017) . However, we argue that the risks are far more profound involve the fundamental mechanisms built into democratic societies.
First, the act of observing citizens through the lens of various, ubiquitous sensors and metrics from apps and devices can change the behavior of the observed (Landsberger, 1958 ).
An example comes from the People's Republic of China whose government is testing the usefulness of a social credit system for "increasing social trust" by incentivizing behaviors the government deems trustworthy. In principle, the idea is similar to the goals of credit bureaus but can potentially lead to the gathering of far more detailed and sensitive data. Two major tech companies in China (Alibaba and TenCent) have already developed applications (Sesame Credit with Alipay and WeChat) to measure many aspects of the everyday behavior of citizens and aggregate this data into a single user score (Botsman, 2017) . The applications are multifunctional, serving as social media, voice-over-IP, payment systems, contact channels for services (including transportation, insurance, banking, and so forth) and sellers (from small shops to supermarkets, from street vendors to restaurants), thus permeating much of the everyday social functioning of citizens (Hvistendahl, 2017) .
The user score is used as a proxy for the users' trustworthiness and leads to both privileges and repercussions. Users are punished for antisocial behaviors (as defined by appcreating companies or the institutions that contracted them) such as leaving a rented bike on the middle of the sidewalk or returning a book to library a few days late. A lower social score results in reduced chances for obtaining credits, higher fees and prices for various services, longer waiting times in airports, and so on. Higher scores result in increased chances to receive credit, easier access to services, and so on.
Some initial observations show that users adapt their behavior to gain higher scores, not only in view of the possible privileges but also through the competitive aspect of the process (Hvistendahl, 2017) . The applications are "gamified", enabling comparisons with one's various social relations and also with strangers and the population at large. Interviews with users indicate, for example, that they are willing to lessen their ties -or cut relations altogether -with others that have low social credit scores, since the system punishes contact with untrustworthy people (Hvistendahl, 2017) . This way even indirect indicators can affect a user's score, thus giving more control to those who maintain the database on citizens.
The social credit system is advertised as a remedy for low social trust among members of Chinese society and as a means to promote pro-social attitudes ("Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014 System ( -2020 System ( )," 2014 . But the act of data gatheringand of altering behaviors through incentives -carries serious risks. For example, the system is opaque to users and neither the creators nor the implementing companies plan to reveal its true mechanics (Botsman, 2017) . This leads to users trying to reverse-engineer and game the system, for example by boosting their scores through buying (and selling) "good" (high scoring) social contacts. This commodification of social virtues, which directly contradicts the purported motivation for the system, can also have long lasting consequences. Monetization of abstract values is often very hard to reverse (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000) . Once trustworthiness is translated into a certain amount of money, it loses any other meaning.
The social consequences constitute only part of the risk of data collection. The more dire danger comes from the fact that even for benevolent governments, an existential goal is to stay in power. For authoritarian leaning leaders this is, of course, even more important. A seemingly harmless app can be a vehicle to pursue such goals by modifying citizen behaviorespecially voting choices. For example, it can be easily imagined that in one party political systems, such as China, any anti-ruling-party activity or contact with people that voice unpopular opinions would be punished. Even in democratic societies, the convenience of an app or platform can be used as a cover for malicious intents that might be enough to slowly but surely undermine the plurality of political opinion that is necessary for democratic societies to self-regulate.
There is also a more nuanced, related risk that stems from the fact that any data gathering that is used to incentivize certain behaviors leads to classification. Data distributions are used to classify observations into meaningful segments -e.g. a typical movie viewer, a standard trajectory of buying choices, and so on. In commercial applications it is natural that sellers and service providers target specific market segments, and such classification is useful.
While any customer is welcome, the products are usually tailored for specific groups, which often reduces their usefulness to others. In democratic societies, public services should be available and accessible to all citizens in a non-discriminatory manner. Any classification can simplify exclusion. For example, data gathering itself, as a result of its linkage to technology adoption and deployment, can be biased to exclude some groups, for instance elder citizens due to low technology use fluency, or citizens of poorer regions due to low public investment in technology in these places (Desouza & Jacob, 2017; Mergel et al., 2016 ; "White House looks at how 'Big Data' can discriminate," 2014). In effect, the services themselves will evolve to suit selected segments of the population.
When the assumption of benevolence on the part of platform and services providers is violated, segmentation of citizens can be used to specifically inconvenience certain groups, favor certain others or simply ignore minorities once they are identified. For example, high levels of support may be more easily maintained by catering to the majority of citizens, who have typical needs and usage patterns. Without the use of apps and platforms, such negligence of minority needs might lead to reduced acceptance of the governing institutions even among the well-served majority, because it creates adversarial context. In the digital sphere, this might be ignored or mistakenly attributed to the specific design of the technology: Excuses such as the "inevitability" of certain outcomes due to technology specifics have already been used to cover deliberate negligence (Zuboff, 2019 ).
An even less visible, but no less important, risk is the possibility of decreasing plurality and diversity. Data classification and data presentation (e.g. in distributions) serves to establish what is typical (no matter its value) and can lead to an implicit definition of what is the norm and what is an aberration. This can lead to gradual development of social norms that would treat any atypical behavior as unacceptable. Freedom of speech and artistic expression are considered diagnostic points for democracy because they demonstrate that radical novelties have a chance of competing against the mainstream thought. Massive aggregation of data might make such breakthroughs far less probable because the limitation of expression of atypical behavior will not follow from direct restrictions imposed from above, which might be easily identified and opposed, but rather through slow, easily overlooked evolution of social norms. In effect, incumbent interests and ideas may become entrenched and diversity may be reduced, potentially impeding any evolution or adaptive changes.
Behavioral programming, data aggregation and behavioral nudging
All these risks might seem daunting, but in fact they are just the tip of the iceberg.
Data gathering by itself, and even combined with easily unpacked incentives for certain behaviors, is a starting point for much more subversive applications when it is used as a source for prediction and covert manipulation of behaviors. Just as it is used in commercial platforms, data gathered on users -citizens -can feed algorithms that can help predict the behavior of individuals as well as control it through appropriately chosen and placed cues.
Behavioral "nudging" can be more successful than direct "pushing" for the reason that because its mechanics are opaque and difficult to understand, it cannot be directly opposed.
A seemingly innocent version of nudging that is not based on extensive data gathering is already being implemented in many policies in the form of behavioral programming. In principle it aims at changing citizen behavior, for the greater good, i.e. pro-social behavior as defined by the policy makers, through small cues embedded in the environment of the public space. The choice of the particular cues or context incentives is often based on theory or study results, rather than on algorithms operating on data. An example is the placement of speed bumps on roads in residential areas or of roundabouts in dangerous spots on roads with higher speed limits to force drivers to slow down. While it is quite easy to identify the goal behind speed bumps, the motivation behind roundabouts can be harder to unpack -and thus can lead to frustration. However, we argue that if the environmental cues are even more nuanced and opaque, the negative side effects can potentially cause more harm than just emotional distress.
This risk is the fact that in behavioral programming the citizens are, to a bigger or lesser degree depending on the particular implementation, deprived of the choice of behavior.
The social deal that lies behind any democratic polity entails a freedom to behave in a prosocial as well as anti-social way. The first behavior is incentivized and the second is deincentivized, mostly with various repercussions. Accepting democracy means accepting the inevitability that some people will consciously break the rules. To maintain the value of freedom inherent to democracy, citizens must have a choice. If the cues and the mechanics in behavioral programming are opaque or invisible (e.g. hidden or simply deployed in such a way as to remain unseen by majority), the behavior range is being purposefully limited. Even if the limit is in the form of a very convincing affordance, perhaps simply making some behavior far more accessible, it still constitutes a violation of the freedom of choice. We argue here that it is crucial to preserve the option to disobey, with confidence that education and the marketplace of ideas, combined with the cultivation of a respect for moral choice at a societal level, will ultimately promote the right choice.
Of course, if the governmental institutions have particular interests in mind other than serving the population in its whole, then behavioral programming can be purposefully misused. Historically, environmental affordances have been used to push certain policies. For example, black and white neighborhoods in U.S. were separated with highways to limit the possibility of contact by making it require effort (Lessig, 2000) . Architectural constraints are effective for such subversive goals, as they are often perceived by citizens as an inevitability rather than a planned choice and thus overlooked. This lack of conscious perception of such cues as policy measures leaves them out of public oversight, not only limiting the choice of behavior but also limiting the constituents' ability of assessing how well the governmental bodies are serving public needs.
Behavioral programming, with its current risks, is just a lighter version of behavioral nudging. The problems with limiting the choice of behavior are naturally far more pronounced when the cues and contextual triggers are explicitly introduced in an innocuous way. The first principle of nudging is to make the incentives as invisible as possible, which in turn makes opting out -choosing other behaviors -almost impossible. The second principle of nudging is to base the choice of interventions or incentives on Big Data. In behavioral programming the same contextual cue is used for all individuals. However, if data from many services and many citizen actions are aggregated and linked into detailed user profiles, the cues can be "personalized": tailored to the characteristics of particular individuals on the basis of their vulnerabilities. In this way they become not only an affordance that makes one specific behavior more likely, but a force that truly programs the action of individuals giving them little chance for informed choice.
Taken together, data gathering and behavioral nudging based on linked data can destabilize certain self-regulatory mechanisms inherent to democratic regimes. Data gathering can change the behavior of the observed especially if it allows segmentation of the population and the development of different incentives for different groups. Algorithms operating on the data can add to this the ability to personalize the cues and triggers for certain behaviors with unprecedented accuracy while remaining unseen. These two characteristics of platform-based services allow providers in the business sector to cut their ties to the population as their source of customers and workers, and they enable providers to shape both the needs and the buying choices of the service users with few repercussions for alienating certain populations.
Similarly, these two characteristics may enable governmental institutions to detach themselves from the constituents by defining norms for behavior and shaping the behavior of individual persons without any accountability.
Trust in code
Advocates of extensive data gathering and analytics often argue that data provides the much needed transparency of citizen behavior and thus increases trust and builds social capital. In fact, the Chinese social credit system is advertised as a panacea for low trust among the populace through helping the people quickly assess the trustworthiness of others (Botsman, 2017) . For example, citizens in rural areas had trouble accessing credit facilities due to a lack of financial transaction history. The social credit system aims to fix it by providing assessment of other behaviors as a proxy ("Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)," 2014).
This logic reveals a major misunderstanding of the role of pervasive data gathering for assessing trustworthiness and building trust in the society. It is presumed that trust or trustworthiness are objective phenomenon. The social score systems based on data repeat the same mistake that earlier plagued the manifestos of the Internet and cryptocurrencies (Blankenship (aka The Mentor), 1986; Nakamoto, 2009). All these promoted trust in code instead of trust in institutions or announced that trust was no longer necessary as code would substitute it, replacing the feeble, subjective psychological and human institutions with robust and, importantly, objective algorithms.
In truth, trusting code means simply shifting the trust from its interpersonal form (as is the case in social relations) or institutional form (as is the case with governmental or financial institutions overlooking information transfer and financial transactions) to all the pieces that make up particular technologies -from the infrastructure (sensors, cables, and computers, all of which sometimes fail) to the protocols, software, and algorithmic engines upon which they rely (Schneier, 2019) . What is more important, behind all the elements that make up these technologies are human creators -engineers, programmers, businesses and institutions -who make choices that are reflected in how the technology operates. These choices often reflect the particular interests of providers of platforms and services. In the end, when trusting the technology, instead of partaking in such decisions the citizens accept them as "technological inevitability". In effect, service providers and the institutions that contract them shirk the responsibility for their decisions as well as the products and the services they supply: without the scapegoat of "technological inevitability", their erroneous or malicious choices would result in lower trust from customers or users.
This issue is of course exacerbated if the creators or overseers of a technological solution have an agenda and are able to keep the precise mechanics (i.e. how their choices drive the functioning of the technology) obscure. This may be the case both in public sector (as in the Chinese systems) or private sector (for example, in user profiling systems for ad personalization or credit scoring). In both cases, the end users never receive the actual bits and pieces of information that constitute the system and contribute to its alleged "transparency" -e.g. data on how other people behave -but rather a derivative form of that data that includes inbuilt heuristics and inferential strategies that are not revealed to the user. Thus, we can argue that both the advertised qualities of transparency and trust are illusory -trust is shifted elsewhere or abandoned all together and replaced with mistrust (i.e. constant checking of others actions to be sure that they behave accordingly to expectations), and transparency is lost by replacing publicly overseen institutions with code that not only includes some invisible heuristics but also is difficult to audit.
Data centralization
One of the principles of democracy is the assignment of decision-making power to the citizens. In representative democracy, political theory aside, this principle is implemented by decentralization of governance, i.e. a process of decision making that underscores the variability in local circumstances, situation, needs and values. Diversity is recognized as conducive to better solutions and adaptation in diverse sciences -from political science (Ober, 2008) to social science (Cioffi-Revilla, 2005) , complexity (Simon, 1962) , systems science (Page, 2008) and many others.
Local authorities and policy makers are tasked with translating national, generalized regulations and strategies into fitting solutions and policies that in their diverse forms would specifically address local needs. Local governments and non-governmental organizations also represent these needs in national forums, making sure that in turn the multitude of local circumstances influence national level policies and long term strategies. Thus, there is a feedback loop between local and central governments that in principle should enable the equal and fair development of whole societies.
The main risk in a free flow of data between government authorities and public services within and across departments and institutions lies in the fact that data shared in this way contributes to building a centralized data cache. While the opportunities from having such a cache are often described (Desouza & Jacob, 2017) , we argue that the risks outweigh them. By definition, the centralized database moves power from local, decentralized departments to centralized decision making. It is tempting to claim that such global caches of data are more useful exactly due to their size and scope (and due to the properties of statistical models that might use them to forecast), but in most cases, it is exactly the opposite. In most social and governance problems there are no fit-for-all solutions. The effectiveness of policies relies on their fitness to specific needs. Decision-making based on centralized data might be skewed towards catering to the "average" citizen that actually does not exist.
As an example, we consider public transportation services in small-to medium-sized towns in industrial regions. Introduction of technology such as fares paid via apps or smart meters in vehicles can lead to a cache of data on the human flows, their timing, and their volume, which in turn can be used to optimize routes and timetables. However, if one city is known for its baking industry and another for its clothing industry, the timing of public transport usage will be quite different. Averaging might give some estimates of central tendency that are entirely spurious due to the bi-modality of the distribution. Similarly, terrain specifics will cause some towns to have evenly spread usage of transportation (plains) and others a varied one (hilly terrain). Each city can be classified on many such dimensions, giving a unique profile that cannot be fittingly approximated from the general distribution. In such services as transportation the local specifics will be always stronger predictors than global statistics.
In contrast, local databases, organized in an application-specific way, with delinked user data, may provide local authorities with social capital to improve the local conditions by developing fitting solutions with public funds at their disposal. Such public services as transportation, public space, cultural artifacts and collections thereof (such as museums or galleries) can be enhanced by improving their functioning, accessibility or display based on locally gathered data. We argue that the better understanding of the specifics present in local institutions is their capital that can be used in nationwide decision making process. Consider again the example of public transportation. Conclusions from analysis of locally gathered data on the mobility of citizens (but not the data itself!) can be a valuable resource that can inform strategies planned by central executive authorities, for example to increase social mobility.
Information on the type and scope of needs of populations in different social strata can be used for a more fitting distribution of public funds on subsidizing non-solvent, but socially crucial, transportation companies -contractors for public transport. Such nationwide distribution of funds through corresponding policies, which might only redistribute the same budget without increasing it, may increase the public acceptance of the central government and thus its chances of staying in power. In this way, local institutions can trade their knowledge for securing the needs of its citizens.
It is important to notice that here, knowledge differs from information or raw data.
Knowledge is extracted from data by analysis and inference, both of which are mechanisms that are influenced by heuristics, assumptions, and previous knowledge or even moral values of the analyzers. The same data can be analyzed in many ways that are mathematically correct, in which some would lead to valuable conclusions but others would be useless. In this way, the knowledge that local institutions can bring to the table when negotiating with their peers or with the central government is unique and constitutes social capital, a resource that grows and evolves in a path dependent way, inseparable from local history and values, and which cannot be reduced to a certain number of bits of data. Transferring data to a central cache detracts from the usefulness of this capital, as the role of such knowledge in policy making on national level will be diminished. A central database is also susceptible to abuse, especially if the benevolence assumption is violated. Managing such a database and granting access to it could become a playing card in many negotiations and decision making processes -an invaluable resource with which the data managers can buy the compliance of various departments and areas of governance, further increasing the concentration of power. In effect, centralized databases holding citizen data reduce both the representation of diversity as well as the decentralization of governance, both of which are fundamental to democracy.
Design principles for data management in the public sector
The transfer of public services from offline into the digital by implementing them in mobile applications and web-based platforms can improve the participation of citizens and increase convenience, but it also carries serious risks that need to be mitigated. These dangers described in the previous sections can be traced back to three main practices that should be avoided in the public sector: collecting data well beyond what is necessary to deliver services; storage, maintenance, and analysis of data via a centralized cache; and aggregation of data from different sources into citizen profiles by controlling linkages of data points. We argue that these three practices should by all means be avoided in the public sector and that eliminating them should become a basic design principle for developing technological system for the provision of public services. It is often difficult or impossible to retrofit an existing infrastructure to respect such constraints, and therefore digital public services should be designed from the starting point to respect these principles.
Principle 1. Minimizing data collection
Public services delivered via applications and platforms and in principle all services that digitize data on their users, should strive to collect only the minimal amount of data required to supply the service. On the system level, i.e. the society as a whole, minimizing data collection will mitigate both the loss of diversity that results from classification, segmentation, and profiling of citizens as well as the reliance on the private data to regulate social relations such as trust. On the individual level, it may reduce the push towards the elusive concept of behavior "within norm" and also, for the public services officers, the possibility of biased decision making due to access to redundant data. For example, when deciding whether to grant welfare bonuses the decision makers should only take into account the data that is legally required and relevant to determine the applicants eligibility. However, psychologically it is difficult to erase the knowledge of or dismiss other variables that are provided "just in case", including income, education, marital status, and so on. Not gathering such data in the first place prevents such bias.
The principle of minimizing data collection has additional caveats. First, the decision on what data is truly needed should not be single handedly made by the service providers, especially not on the basis of "technological inevitability". We argue that neither the technology itself not its low cost justify data gathering. There is a push to innovate in the public sector, but innovation or implementation of innovative technologies should not be a goal in itself. Rather, technology should be a means to achieve goals set by or negotiated with the constituents.
The decision on what information to gather within each service should be dependent on what is the goal of the particular service or the policy that the service is a part of. The goals and the values behind them should be decided in the democratic process -either through the normal election cycle (choosing central and local representatives) or through public consultations. The choice of what data is required to supply or optimize the service should follow from such process of negotiating project goals consistent with public values. Once these are decided, candidate technology should be selected based upon its suitability for achieving those goals, not based on its availability or purported innovativeness. In all cases, there should be transparency in the process of both identifying goals as well as choosing technologies. Public service providers, including central and local government authorities, should be able to explain and justify the methods in which the data is used for the service. In the private sector, some companies implement similar (but not detailed) justification for specific data collection, especially on mobile devices (i.e. justification app permissions). We argue that the public sector should be every bit as transparent, if not more so, on why the data gathering is necessary and how the data are used.
Principle 2. Data decentralization
Data gathered from various public services should persist only for the period of time necessary to supply the service and only within the local systems that perform the particular service. Public service providers should avoid sharing data among services (even local ones) and between local and central authorities. Decentralized data management on the system level allows better optimization of services, builds social capital but also increases robustness through promoting diversity and limiting single points of control.
On the individual level, data decentralization ensures that privacy rights integral to democratic polities are preserved and that citizens are not forced into nonconsensual trust relations. For example, a court warrant is needed in many judicial systems to place a crime suspect under covert surveillance. Yet, if in the process of observing the suspect further information is gathered that points to crimes not under present investigation, such information cannot be used by prosecutors in the court of law until additional warrants for surveillance are obtained. Such regulation prevents an overreach of the executive parts of the government, for the purpose of maintaining a balance between citizen rights and citizen accountability. The fact that digitalized data on citizens can be shared in a costless manner does not justify breaking such balances. Nor does "technological inevitability" associated with automatic synchronization of data, automatic transfers, or backups that involve services or entities beyond the original supplier of service justify upsetting the balance. We argue that exactly because the transfers are so easy and do not incur costs they should be policed even more vigilantly -not only in the area of law enforcement, but in all contacts of citizens with public officials that produce digital records of the interaction.
The ease of communicating data between different public services or branches of the government makes it seem that this process is natural and benign, but in fact it creates much room for abuse. Shared data naturally coalesces into a larger, centralized database that can be used by its curators to exert influences beyond their institutionally warranted prerogatives.
Rather than attempting to overturn the precedent of sharing data freely once some vulnerability has already been exploited, policy makers should design public services from the beginning without automatic or free transfers of data. In each case when data flow is considered beneficial, the citizen (or a legally authorized body in a due process) should positively affirm whether to allow transfer. Even in the case of transfers of specific data records the records should not contain information that links together different independent transactions performed by the same person.
The practice of free sharing of data on citizens between various institutions is often legitimized by the argument that the government would be more effective if it acts as a unitary institution. Even if we treat the government as a single entity, which it is not, the systemic consequences of data centralization, which include lack of suitability for addressing local needs, the tendency to cater to the non-existing average citizen, and the dissipation of local social capital, are still present. In principle, the various government agencies and the public services they provide are accountable to the constituents as separate entities. In a democratic society, the accountability is implemented by separate feedback processes in which citizens assess the services in each area separately and the result of their assessments influences their choices in elections. For example, if a certain government manages welfare well but manages education poorly, it still may be assessed poorly by those with a particular interest in education (e.g. parents), who might choose other parties in the following elections.
Decentralized data maintenance, enabled by trust relationships between local institutions and the citizens who make use of their service can boost social capital by promoting citizens' agency and participation in local governance.
We argue that public institutions should be held to the same or higher standards as private ones when it comes to passing data to third parties (here: public institutions and governmental agencies beyond the specific one that the citizen is sharing data with within a particular service). As we have described in the first section, such data sharing and the resultant data centralization already allows private marketing companies to subvert the democratic process through targeted political campaigns. Government agencies have more tools at their disposal than campaigns, such as policies targeted at specific segments of the populations, as described in section two, and for this reason sharing data between public institutions might have more dire consequences. To avoid creating such vulnerabilities, the collection of data that might be of interest to third parties should require explicit user consent, both for its collection in the first instance and for its distribution to specific third parties. All public services should be accountable to have all the necessary consents for the data they hold: If they have not been given explicit consent, the data must not be collected or shared in the first instance. If the data have been collected in error, then it must be destroyed.
Whenever the creation of a technology behind a service or the provision of the whole service is outsourced to private companies or non-governmental organizations, these entities should be held to the same principles. Specifically, they should be required to operate within the regulatory perimeter and to be subject to public oversight just as public institutions are.
This includes transparency in the information that is collected and how it is used, justification for the necessity of data collection and requirement of explicit content when collecting and sharing data. Moreover, citizens should not be forced into non-consensual relationships with third party operators. At minimum, when provision of the service is impossible without outsourcing to private agents, the citizens' freedom of choice of private-sector providers should be protected. A selection of providers should be available so that the users are able to assess their trustworthiness and to develop trust relations at will.
Principle 3. Keeping data linkages a citizen prerogative
Data centralization by itself can pose some risks, and these should by all means be mitigated, but even greater dangers come from linking the various record in the databases, either directly, such as to each other or to user identity, or indirectly, for example by time or type of activity. On the individual level, uncontrolled power to link together different attributes or transactions associated with an individual person threatens the inalienable right to privacy. If multiple requests for the service (e.g. wherein persons board public transportation vehicles) can be linked to each other (e.g. the same passenger card was used), then the person can be profiled, and his or her linked activities can provide additional information (e.g. the person's occupation or employer) even when other identifying information is not known.
Further examples of inferences might include determining home address by identifying travel starting points, identifying habits and social class from destinations in shopping and dining areas, and so on. If the services require providing even more sensitive data, naturally the profiles will also be more detailed. Such aggregation and linkage of data points infringes on the privacy of citizens -privacy requires not only protecting precise identification in the form of a name or an ID, but keeping secure the complex, intertwined characteristics, behaviors, and associations of a given person. While the use of a person's full name or phone number are the easiest way to link activities of the same individual, in themselves they give little data.
What is important are the data that are linked through such identifiers. Allowing the citizens to manage when and which data are linked ensures that their right to remain private is protected.
On the system level, the detailed profiles of citizens, irrespective of whether they are linked by an ID or by some other feature, such as device MAC address, debit or credit card numbers, and so on, create profound vulnerabilities that can be abused to compromise democratic processes. From the launching of targeted campaigns, to systematic neglect of specific citizen groups, to suppression of the rights of political opponents, to manipulation of needs and opinions, all of the risks described in detail in the previous section, may result from allowing the public institutions to handle data linkage. We argue that the practice of allowing users to control the linkages among their data records should be part of the design in all public services provided digitally. This means that more responsibility would lie on the individual, which in turn would require public service providers to organize proper education and informational campaigns. Citizens should be aware not only of the risks of unlimited data linking but also of their rights to remain private, and their responsibility in keeping the data secure. Ensuring that data linkages are in the hands of individuals requires both appropriate management of the database in which instances of service provision are not linked and the preservation of non-digital options to access the service. For example, any public service that requires payments should never exclude cash payments: alongside other options, the citizens should be able to choose the one that ensures to their satisfaction that their various payments are not linked or tracked.
Techniques
Although the protection of essential human rights must start with institutional leadership in the form of initiatives to establish clear public policy, changes to the way that public services use technology will also be necessary, both to implement the required policy and also to demonstrate conclusively to the public that such measures have been taken in good faith. Because individuals cannot prove that data are not shared, aggregated, or otherwise abused once collected, we recommend as a general rule that whenever possible, data should not be collected in the first place. Whenever data collection is required to provide the service, then the collection should be done by locally accountable authorities, and the extent and quantity of the data collected should be minimized.
We identify five specific techniques that can be used as design primitives for the establishment (and, in many cases, refactoring) of technology infrastructure for public services. The main objectives of these techniques are to avoid the collection and aggregation of personal data and to keep the linkage between data records pertaining to individual persons strictly in the hands of the individual persons themselves.
Technique 1. Metadata-resistant, attribute-based credentials.
The first technique we propose can serve the first principle -minimizing data collection -as well as the last one -allowing individuals to manage the linkages between their data. The idea is to minimize gathering unnecessary data attributes of service users and to rely on the specific attributes that are required to give access to a service. Offline credentials and many digitized signed credentials contain metadata such as biometrics (e.g. photographs), references to other credentials (name, address, etc.) , or simply open-ended fields that can be populated with arbitrary information. Sometimes these metadata are automatically transferred when a third party credential is used to authenticate an individual. This can happen for example, when a user logs in with a social media login to be able to comment on a public service website, or when social media profiles are used for public services.
Metadata included in these ways are self-defeating, particularly for electronic credentials that are automatically associated with transaction records when they are presented, if our goal is to minimize data collection and prevent linkages between transactions carried out by the same individual. Rather than providing issuers with a way to potentially deanonymize their clients, systems should instead require issuers to generate a set of signing keys, one for each attribute for which the issuer can make an attestation about an individual, and use the appropriate key to generate a bare signature without any metadata. The particular attribute implied by the signature is determined from the choice of key that used to generate the signature. For example, if citizens paying their taxes in a particular region are eligible for reduced fees for public transportation services in that region, the only attribute that they should be required to present to receive the discount should be "Y is a tax payer in region X".
Thus, a key specific to attributes of tax paying locations should be used to sign such a message which can then be shown to public transportation officials to authorize the citizen to receive reduced fares. No additional information should be required or automatically linked. It may seem that the easiest way would be for the citizen to present a paper or a digital tax form that he or she submitted. However, this way the citizen inadvertently reveals many more personal attributes, such as name, residential address, income, marital status, and so forth.
Instead, she should be able to receive a signed credential from the tax office that does not include any other attributes than the office where the tax form was submitted.
Technique 2. Blind signatures.
A related technique that would support attribute based authorization are blind signatures. This solution can also help minimize data collection and automatic linkages. If the issuer of a credential signs a message about a client, and if the client then delivers this message to a relying party or to anyone else, then the issuer will be able to identify and track the signature when it is furnished to a relying party. This creates a problem, particularly if the issuer is asked to maintain identifying records linking its clients to its signatures and to disclose information on demand that links the signatures to those records. The solution is for the system to support blind signatures. A blind signature scheme requires a 'blinding' function that (a) when applied to a message, obfuscates the contents of that message for anyone who does not know the inverse of the function, and (b) commutes with the cryptographic signing function that will be used by the signer of some message (Chaum, 1983) . Then, a client can first apply the 'blinding' function to some message, then send the 'blinded' message to an issuer to be signed, and finally apply the inverse of the 'blinding' function to reveal a signature on the original message. The effect is akin to (a) writing a message on a slip of paper, (b) inserting that slip of paper along with a slip of carbon paper into a sealed security envelope, (c) asking the issuer to sign the outside of the envelope and then return the envelope without breaking the seal, and finally (d) opening the envelope to reveal the original message with the signature of the issuer.
The value of this approach is that, although everyone can see that the issuer signed the envelope, the issuer is not able to recognize the unblended signature when it is presented. In this manner, the issuer would not be able to maintain records that could subsequently deanonymize the client. By obviating such an attack, the use of blind signatures aligns the interests of the issuer with the interests of its clients. Furthermore, because the issuers in this case are less valuable as targets of powerful adversaries, the issuers have reason to support and encourage this approach.
This technique has applications in anonymized voting procedures, but it can just as easily be applicable to any digital service where only a selected number of attributes is required to authenticate or authorize a user. Eligibility to vote can be verified based on nationality, residence or similar attributes by appropriate bodies without the need for them to know how the vote was cast. Similarly, the eligibility to pay reduced fare in public transport can be verified by tax offices without the public transportation knowing how much a citizen earns. Blinded signatures thus allow the service receiving such credentials to verify the user's eligibility without knowing anything else about the individual.
Technique 3. The "once only" rule (single-use credentials).
One important technique to further disable linking of data on user activity is the use of single-use credentials. Credentials such as standard-issue ID numbers or credit cards -or even online login data, especially if a single account is used for many services -that can be used many times are considered convenient for users because they do not require sophisticated devices and online interactions. Unfortunately, this convenience comes at the expense of privacy as observers associate multiple transactions with the same identifier and use this information to construct a profile. Potential observers include not only service providers who are able to identify repeated visits from the same user, but also third parties such as platform operators and governments. We suggest that the linkage problem is the inevitable result of credential reuse, and the solution is to avoid credential reuse altogether by using single-use credentials: an individual presents a particular credential to a service provider exactly once and then never uses the same credential again. There are several ways to implement singleuse credentials; the most appropriate approach would depend upon the application. For example, an individual might stockpile credentials by generating many public keys and requesting each one to be signed by the same issuer, or an individual might receive a stack of physical tokens. The effect is that relying parties such as service providers and platforms would not be able to observe links between the transactions.
As an example, we can return to the public transportation case. We can see that physical, single use tickets are the simplest form of single-use credentials. Individuals purchasing such do not have to reveal any information about themselves and when they validate the ticket or present it to vehicle operators no information is attached except that they are authorized to board the vehicle. Same principles should be obeyed if public transportation tickets are implemented in digital form -whether in pre-paid, mobile app systems or citizen travel cards. Each of these should be implemented as a stack of single-use credentials. That is, the card or app-bought ticket should not contain any information besides the fact that the fare is valid for this trip and was covered. The details of who paid for it, when and where the fare was purchased, and which other options where included should never be gathered at the point of use, stored, or revealed to anyone but the passenger. No tickets encoded in platform, app or card based services should allow automatic linkage between them. It should be the sole privilege and responsibility of the citizen to manage the linkages between her various travels.
Technique 4. User-generated identifiers and keys.
Another aspect of ensuring citizens that their activities are not linked is the manner in which their identifiers are generated and for citizens to manage the linkages between their data, they must be able to generate their own identifiers. When third parties such as the manufacturers of devices or identity cards choose identifiers or keys on behalf of their users, then users have no way to be sure that there is no link between the identifiers or keys and the users that can be exploited either by the third parties themselves, by their business partners, or by others with the power either to monitor their activities, to coerce them to disclose information about specific linkages, or to introduce weaknesses into the mechanism that they use to generate identifiers or keys. Users should not accept identifiers or keys that might be linkable. The solution is for users to generate identifiers and keys on their own devices, using well-audited, open-source technology. Although this step requires a degree of capability on behalf of the user's devices as well as a significant public responsibility to conduct audits and maintenance activities, we suggest that these steps are essential.
Technique 5. Federated infrastructure.
Finally, to help keep the data on citizens decentralized, we propose that public services should be run on federated rather than centralized infrastructure. Infrastructure operated by a global platform operator is problematic at a system level for several reasons, including lack of diversity, lack of incentive for evolution, the opportunity for rent seeking, and so on. Most importantly, the global platform operator has a chance to observe the metadata about all of the transactions, even if the transactions themselves are encrypted. For example, although the global operator of an encrypted chat platform might not be able to read the messages that its users send to each other, the global operator would still be able to see who talks to whom, when, how often, and for how long. Such metadata can still be used to precisely target individuals (Healy, 2013) . Moreover, the global operator would know all of the users of the system, and it would be comparatively difficult for a user to create a new identity and still speak with the same set of counterparties.
We argue that federated approaches, in which individual users connect via a network of local operators who are connected to each other, tend to offer fewer opportunities for abuse because no single operator has complete control or complete information about parties on both sides of all of the bilateral relationships that make use of its infrastructure. Some networks, including communication systems Skype and Twitter, marketplaces such as Amazon, and the payment network SWIFT, are not federated but have centralized operators.
Other networks, including the Internet itself and the international telephone network are federated networks, standardized via multi-stakeholder processes such as those carried out by standards organizations such as IETF and ITU-T. Best execution securities marketplaces established via co-regulation, such as MiFID in Europe and NMS in the United States, are also federated. Federation reduces the presence of control points, which can potentially operate against the interests of the users of the system, and it also encourages competition, both among the local operators themselves and among users seeking to create end-to-end value.
Practical considerations
Identification of design principles and candidate techniques that can fulfil the chosen constraints on data management is the first step to implement privacy-preserving and systemically robust digital public services. However, successful implementation requires that these principles are clear to all stakeholders and broadly adopted. To ensure such adoption and to well-target any changes we need to take a closer look at the digitization of public services, including both the participants and the interactions between them.
We can identify four main groups of stakeholders, each with their own interest and entry point in terms of extant knowledge, skills, and capacities. First, there is the largest group, citizens, who can be assumed to possess, on average, limited knowledge and capacities as well as entrenched habits of technology use. This latter point is especially vital, since an average individual is likely to transfer her typical practices of interacting with commercial services onto public services. She will expect similar usability and similar policies in managing user data and privacy. This unfortunately means that this group of stakeholders will be slow to adopt techniques needed for responsible data management in the public sector because they might be unwilling to make any additional effort that undermines the relative convenience of a "share all" approach. The second group of stakeholders are the central government agencies that are responsible for shaping high level policies and strategies. In principle, we can assume that the governing representative bodies in democratic polities should favor responsible data management and should be willing to follow the principles and implement appropriate techniques. However, the representative bodies are bound by the length of election cycle and are prone to disregard long term benefits in favor of short term electorate gains. The third group are the private sector contractors that would be tasked with developing particular technological solutions. This group's interests generally do not coincide with privacy-preserving data management in public services. Consider a contract wherein private businesses are permitted to operate platforms for public services with citizen data that might potentially be of interest both to central authorities (who reduce direct costs while still obtaining the product) and private companies, who seek to benefit from exploiting the personal data. Such exploitation is extremely detrimental to the citizen group in aggregate, in terms of both economics and political agency. Finally, the fourth group includes executive officials, often specialists, tasked with procuring, managing and overseeing the implementation of specific policies and public services, including their digital versions.
These experts, who generally work on behalf of the executive branches of the government, are driven less by short election cycles, are bound by more direct relations of trust and accountability to the constituents, and can benefit from appropriate implementation of data management. This group could benefit greatly from targeted knowledge bases and best practice reviews that promote a critical approach to data management -including outsourcing to commercial organizations -in the public sector. For this reason, executive officials are especially valuable to policy dialogue, wherein scientific concepts and analysis of the full consequences of digitizing the public sector can meet the practical constraints of policy making.
